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North Korea, Quo Vadis?
Karl H. Stingeder
North  Korean  politics  appears  neither  irrational  nor
unpredictable:  the  logic  of  its  actions  may  at  ﬁrst  seem
opaque,  but  it  nonetheless  displays  its  own  rationale  and
patterns. – North Korea: a ruthless political actor, now under
the  leadership  of  Kim  Jong-Un  who  inherited  the  regime’s
leadership from his father and "Supreme Leader", Kim Jong-Il,
in 2011. The country’s policy is based on its ongoing political
agenda of (nuclear) brinkmanship, a true threat to the world –
or at least that's how the Western hemisphere sees it. Yet our
factual knowledge of this post-Leninist and totalitarian regime
is  extremely  limited  and  relatively  distorted;  it  is  largely
circumstantial  evidence  and  judgmental  speculation  that
accounts for our perception of this East Asian state. Northeast
Asia (China, Japan, South and North Korea, Taiwan) is a region
dominated by the legacy of the Cold War. The North Korean
leadership has indeed established its priorities, primarily its
isolationist  orientation,  but  in  the  long  term  the  regime
cannot  survive without  external  stimulus.  Most  importantly,
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even in a long-term, non-violent and gradual transformation
of North Korea considerable danger can ultimately result in
the demise of  the regime.  Apart  from few signs of  a North
Korean "civil society", currently only the army might have the
resources to see through a regime change. In the meantime,
the strategies of isolationism as well  as tight control  of the
media remain as fundamental cornerstones of the regime. A
close-knit network of social control has been established and
access  to  the  internet  for  the  most  part  is  limited  to  the
regime’s entrusted cadre.
1. Dawning of a North Korean "Civil Society"? [1]
North Korea is widely perceived as a ruthless politic actor, now under the
leadership of Kim Jong-Un who has inherited the regime’s leadership from
his father and "Supreme Leader",  Kim Jong-Il,  in 2011, in guided by its
political agenda of (nuclear) brinkmanship, a true threat to the world –or
at least that’s how the Western hemisphere sees it. Despite, or perhaps
because of, the possible implications of reform measures, the potential
threat  of  armed  conﬂict  should  not  be  overlooked.  In  the  scientiﬁc
community,  it  is  widely  assumed that  if  that  happens,  nobody will  be
immune to the consequences throughout the whole region. (cf. Ahn 2001:
166)  Secondly,  even  in  a  long-term,  non-violent  and  gradual
transformation of  North Korea considerable danger can be seen since
there would be no going back after  having reached a certain point  of
opening.  (cf.  Bluth 2008: 191) Ultimately,  even transformation over the
long-term involves the risk of a sudden and regime-change and out-of-
control war: a power vacuum in North Korea after a collapse may not be
without risk due to its "civil  society" being in its infancy and a political
opposition that does not seem to exist yet.
As the "civil society" in North Korea in its current state is by no means
comparable to "Western standards" and as political opposition has yet to
emerge, the roots of North Korea’s totalitarianism are often diﬃcult for
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outsiders to understand. Frank makes a very valid point "[while it is quite
true  that]  The  state  of  North  Korea  deviates  in  many  respects  from
Western  norms  regarding  an  institutional  framework,  or  what  Oliver
Williamson has termed the ‘rules of  the game in a  society’  [does]  this
make North Korea ‘different’? Such an assumption would be fatal in many
regards, since it ignores the many options and tools for understanding
this society. Moreover, to claim that these do not apply to North Korea
would  be  nothing  less  than  to  seriously  question  the  relevance  of  all
social  science theories.  Last  but  not  least,  it  would  mean denying the
people of North Korea the condition of humanness. This would not only
be  factually  wrong,  but  also  highly  cynical."  (Frank  2010:  Foreword;
Stingeder 2010: 9)
In view of North Korean "(civil) society", any assessment should be highly
differentiated. Insofar as "[…] 'civil society' is seen as a political-ideological
battle on which very alternative concepts of order and development can
emerge  in  society",  (cf.  Hirsch  2001:  19,  translated  from  the  German)
there may be reason for cautious optimism. Currently, only few indicators
of "political resistance" can be acknowledged, yet circumstantial evidence
would suggest the ﬁrst subtle indicator of a "civil society" in North Korea.
In  this context,  North  Korean  market  women  in  particular  must  be
mentioned,  as  being  apparently  able  to  establish  their  own  "power
sphere" based upon on a speciﬁc "code" when faced with North Korea’s
maledominated social structure. Thus there are reports showing that in
April  2008  thousands  of  market  women  in  the  city  of  Chongjin  had
publicly  protested  against  the  execution  of  15  colleagues.  An  age
restriction previously arranged by local oﬃcials seems to have been lifted
as a result of the protests. By the end of 2007, the age limit for women
allowed to engage in trade had been increased to 50 years.  (cf.  World
Tribune  2008:  Internet  source)  Consequently,  this  ﬁrst  seed  of  North
Korean "civil  society" could be interpreted here insofar as many young
women decided to undermine oﬃcial  policy by cooperating with older
women. Seemingly, these younger women made every effort to elude the
oﬃcial ban on trade. How much credence can be given to these rumor-
based reports, it is still  risky to assess at this stage. However, it seems
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quite  plausible  that  the 2002 reform measures have already started a
development  that  is  impossible  to  reverse.  For  this  reason,  it  is  quite
possible that step by step and with accompanying economic relaxations, a
"civil society" might slowly be arising. At this stage, however, the regime’s
systematic indoctrination and social control seem to prevent any political
opposition from emerging.
The opaqueness of North Korea’s "civil  society" (due to lack of tangible
scientiﬁc  data)  can  be  best  compared  with  what  little  is  known  –  or
suspected  –  about  the  political  "inner  spheres"  of  the  regime.  The
structure of the North Korean elite is illuminated by Mansourov’s work in
terms of spheres of inﬂuence around Kim Jong-il, and now by his son and
successor  Kim  Jon  Un.  Accordingly,  the  North  Korean  government  is
regarded  as  an  organized  set  of  competing  and  sometimes  less  rigid
structural  elements,  whose  procedure  seems  to  be  characterized  by
sluggish bureaucracy. These rigid structures are on the one hand causing
an  inherent  potential  of  ambiguous  and  contradictory  mutual  policy
decisions. On the other hand, these structures would regularly become
involved in the power struggles of competing clans and would be utilized
in accordance with their speciﬁc power goals. In North Korean clans, the
circles of power are focused on Kim Jong Un. The elitist court of North
Korea  concentrated  in  Pyongyang,  on  the  other  hand,  consists  of  six
families  in  direct  relationship  to  the  regime.  An  elite  circle  that  is
constantly vying for the leader’s attention. This power dynamic in place is
resulting  in  permanent  and  dynastically-dominated  ﬁght  for  privileges
and  positions,  which  are  likely  to  be  advantageous  from  each  of  the
competing parties viewpoint. The North’s power elite structure has thus
neither been consistent, nor would it be justiﬁed to deﬁne it as a "black
box"  in  the  sense  of  a  complex  and  opaque  system.  There  are  ﬁve
powerful political forces in the country, permeating all spheres of political
life: the "Establishment" around the preservation of national security, the
"Old Guard", the "Technocrats", "Local Elites" and the so-called "Foreign
Wind".  The  last  is  composed of  stakeholders  around Korean  exiles  or
Koreans born abroad (with roots  in  Korea),  who actually  live  in  China,
Japan,  Russia,  USA  and  South  Korea.  These  power  competitors  are
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intending, therefore, to gain inﬂuence over Kim Jong Un’s family clan. They
are anxious to achieve the vision of the respective national development
as well as to secure a "slice of the cake" for themselves. The suspected
exercise of  inﬂuence towards the dynastic  "family farm" is  crowned by
various successes in the short run. (cf. Mansourov 2006: 37–54)
2. Control of the Media
In addition to the aforementioned internal "power spheres" as one of the
regime’s  political  cornerstones,  North  Korean  isolationism  still  plays  a
central  role  in  the  eyes  of  the  regime.  This  policy  is  aimed  at
systematically controlling its people. International travel is still exclusively
reserved for the diplomatic sector and all travel plans must be approved
in advance by regime oﬃcials. Furthermore, access to the telephone and
Internet is only granted to the elite. Up to date, citizens of the country
have virtually no access to news that has not passed through the regime’s
censorship and propaganda machinery. Even radio reception is restricted
through statutory manipulated radio sets,  thus radio news also seems
part  of  the  regime’s  propaganda  apparatus.  (cf.  Becker  2005:  132)
According to a recent news bulletin on the website North Korean Tech,
several  private  radio stations have been able  to  broadcast,  in  spite  of
cloud screening activities by the North Korean regime: "Some are jammed
by North Korea making reception diﬃcult – but not impossible – inside
the country." (cf. Williams, North Korea Tech 2013: Internet source)
What is more, an extremely close-knit network of social control has been
established by the regime in order to ensure that divergent thinking and
protest behavior does not remain hidden and can be nipped in the bud.
Bluth illustrates this by means of the failed project  to connect the rail
network of  North and South Korea.  The military may have vetoed the
project. In this context, and as further evidence of disparities within the
North  Korean  elite,  a  study  by  the  International  Institute  for  Strategic
Studies  might  be  worth  mentioning  since  the  report  indicates  the
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existence of power struggles between reformers and hardliners.(cf.  ISS
2004, cited by Bluth 2008: 180–181).
Moreover,  an  alleged  North  Korean  controversy  surrounding  the
introduction  of  cell  phones  states  another  interesting  media  related
incident:  the  faction  of  "the  reformers"  would  ﬁrst  have  been able  to
achieve political support for the initiative, which would have provided a
limited availability of cell phones in North Korea. However, this decision
would have been revised by the security forces shortly thereafter. In this
context,  it  is  worth  underlining  that  despite  some  inconsistencies  in
political  decision-making  processes  in  North  Korea,  the  full  power  of
decision still  may lie  in Kim Jong Un’s  hands as the country’s  de facto
dictator. From him, social control of the country would be so closely knit
that no institution would be able to channel any dissatisfaction among
the people. (cf. Bluth 2008: 180–181) This can be seen as a clear indication
for the perpetual and strong underdevelopment of aforementioned North
Korean "civil society".
A  commitment  to  one  of  the  many  "reeducation  camps"  of  the
systematically organized North Korean camp system often results in long
prison sentences and forced labor under harsh conditions. Furthermore,
arrests  supposedly  justiﬁed  by  "political  offenses"  often  result  in  the
death of the detainee. A fundamental element of social pressure within
North Korea’s  camp network is  illustrated by the practice of  "collective
punishment": particularly in the case of arrests labeled as political crimes,
the entire family of the accused is at risk of imprisonment.  (cf.  Becker
2005:  90)  This  being  the  case,  a  judicial  system according  to  Western
standards  does  not  seem  to  exist  in  North  Korea.  There  is  also  no
evidence of due legal process.
3. Totalitarianism
In  light  of  the  aforementioned  restrictions,  from  a  political  and
particularly a civil and human rights perspective, one might question what
philosophical  and  theoretical  pillow  the  regime  rests  its  totalitarianist
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head  on.  In  a  nutshell,  it  is  the  principle  of  autarky  and  the  entire
Confucian-dynastic ideology. It is an ideology which has transformed itself
from communism to a speciﬁc North Korean "conglomerate" forming the
conceptual basis for the regime, while at the same time constituting the
reason for the country’s political and social isolationism. In addition, Kim
Jong-Il’s  "prioritisation"  of  the military,  which has been perpetuated by
Kim  Jong  Un,  has  largely  contributed  to  solidifying  his  aspirations  of
establishing  a  secured  power  base.  Most  remarkably,  and  despite  the
North Korean reform dilemma, this development has not yet led to the
collapse of the regime. On the contrary, it can be asserted that without
isolationism,  the  elitist  circles  of  power  would  have  to  do  without  an
integral power factor of vital importance for the survival of the regime:
total control of North Korea. (cf. Stingeder 2010: 66-67)
Dogmatic leadership seems indeed to be theoretically substantiated by
Juche.  In  North  Korea,  ideological  "truth"  is  not  debatable;  it  is  self-
explanatory and perceived as ﬂawless. (cf. Stingeder 2010: 45) But what is
behind this Idea of Juche? In fact, Korean historical heritage shapes the
perception  of  the  other’s  viewpoint,  limiting  and  reserving  one’s  own
perspective on the Korean people’s proclaimed "true heritage". (cf. Bluth
2008: 178) Paternalistic and neo-Confucian concepts were subsequently
an integral part of the development of Juche ideology: one major feature
is the so-called "father thought" in Confucianism. This principle manifests
itself  in  a belief  in the infallible discernment of  certain individuals.  (cf.
Bluth 2008: ibid. and cf. Becker 2005: 76)
4. Roots, Reforms and Risks
Considering the tight political and civil limitations enforced by the North
Korean regime and founded on the Juche philosophy, an idea which is
widely accepted and deeply rooted in North Korea’s socio-political culture
up to date, a detailed assessment of North Korea’s civilian population is
currently and still very problematic. Hence, a serious study and empirical
evaluation would require unchecked access to the population as well as
the major state archives in order to acquire empirical data.
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It would seem that the commitment of the population is largely absent at
the  present  time.  For  this  reason,  probably  the  army  alone  has  the
resources to achieve a regime change, which could most likely only be
initiated  from  inside  the  system.  Whilst  North  Korean  economic
orientation always seems to be guided by the Juche idea, North Korea’s
claim to be autonomous seems nonexistent in policy: North Korea is still
dependent on foreign aid to ensure adequate supplies, which otherwise
could  ultimately  result  in  the  population’s  malnutrition.  (cf.  Quinones
2006: 94)
Most importantly, the perpetuation of a secluded political system is the
highest priority for the regime; this constellation is supported by a slew of
propaganda. And with great certainty, the economy remains key for the
fate  of  North  Korea  and  its  current  regime.  Around  the  turn  of  the
century, according to Eberstadt, North Korea had in fact been the only
country whose economy was completely disconnected from the capital
value of money. Besides North Korea, only during the reign of the Khmer
in  Cambodia,  money  as  means  of  bartering  had  been  completely
abolished.  Nevertheless,  introducing the value of  money due to  North
Korea’s economic reforms should be seen a "condition sine qua non" for
reviving  languishing  North  Korean  planned  economy  mechanisms.  (cf.
Eberstadt 2006: 290) Ultimately, Eberstadt sees a "[a] planned economy
without planning." (Kimura 1994: cited by Eberstadt 2006: 291)
The historic roots of the immanent deteriorated economic status of North
Korea can be traced back  to  the dissolution of  the  Soviet  Union:  This
assumption is substantiated by historical developments: the collapse of
the Soviet  Union resulted in  a  fundamental  power-political  change for
North  Korea,  since  the  regime  was  henceforth  no  longer  under  the
protection  of  a  "superpower".  Moreover,  from  the  mid-1990s  Russia
started  to  normalize  its  relations  with  South  Korea,  which  led  to
increasing trade volume between Russia and the South. At the same time,
support from China and Russia for North Korea decreased or dried up
entirely. (cf. Kang 2003: 57 et seq., cited by Stingeder 2010: 71) At present,
economic development has stalled for the most part, but as a result of
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isolationistic framework conditions. The fact that most foreign investors
(except South Korea and China) still remain outside the country illustrates
North  Korea’s  continued  fragile  economic  situation.  The  regime  has
continuously  disallowed the structural  reform of  the eroded economic
system.  Minor  adaptations  have  been  given  priority,  such  as  price
adjustments. Although the regime reacted by introducing market-based
reform  measures  between  2002  and  2003,  (cf. Becker  2005:  264,  cf.
Mansourov  2006:  47–48)  and  the  economic  situation  remains  virtually
unchanged and precarious. To date, it  is shaped by a need for foreign
investment, a lack of infrastructure and an immense inﬂationary spiral.
(cf. Stingeder 2010: 57–58) Despite some slight improvements and reports
about more money ﬂowing into the country as well as initial signs "tiny
but growing middle class" (NPR.org 2013: Internet source), North Korea’s
overall economic conditions and political framework remain suboptimal
(cf. Kihl 2006: 14 et seq.). The economic situation in North Korea to date
must indeed be regarded as a vicious circle.
5. North Korea, Quo vadis?
In light of recent events in North Korea – the execution and removal of Mr
Jang, one of the most senior cadre members of the regime and Kim Jong
Un’s  uncle  –  the  regime’s  current  leader  has  succeeded  in  giving  the
outside world an image of North Korea that is  even more chilling and
unpredictable than before. Why purge a senior Politburo member with
the  rank  of  general  in  the  North’s  army?  Why was  one of  the  central
ﬁgures in securing Kim Jong Un’s succession executed? As The Economist,
a  news magazine,  in  a  recent  commentary  states,  the most  surprising
aspect  of  Mr Jang’s  execution is  the broad range of  public  accusation,
despite  his  achievements  for  Kim  Jong  Un:  "such  anti-party,  counter-
revolutionary factional acts as gnawing at the unity and cohesion of the
party,  selling  natural  resources  too  cheaply;  womanising  [sic!];  being
wined and dined at  back parlours of  deluxe restaurants;  taking drugs;
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squandering foreign currency in casinos." (The Economist 2013: 52 and
ibid: Internet source)
Ultimately,  I  tend to agree with the Economist’s point of view. Whilst a
member of the regime’s elite being corrupt and despotic should not come
as a surprise, the fact that North Korea’s media has openly cruciﬁed a
former  elite  member  of  the  regime  most  deﬁnitely  should:  "Soon
afterwards the purge made the front pages and television news in North
Korea,  with  scenes  of  the  moment  of  his  detention,  at  an  enlarged
meeting of the Politburo, where he was yanked from his seat in front of
his comrades. China has more experience of this kind of theatre, from the
viliﬁcations campaigns of the Cultural Revolution to the juicy trial this year
of  Bo Xilai,  a  former  Politburo member.  North  Korea,  in  contrast,  has
nearly  always  dispatched its  disgraced cadres  into  silent  oblivion."  (cf.
ibid.). I would therefore like to pose the question as to whether a new age
of political PR could be dawning in North Korea. To put it more succinctly,
I  would  like  to  talk  about  the  elephant  in  the  room  by  asking  one
question: can the public sacking of the regime’s most senior oﬃcials be
viewed as an indication of an emerging new style of (more unpredictable)
power-prolonging  leadership  by  Kim  Jong  Un?  Ultimately,  the  public
cruciﬁxion  could  prove  to  be  the  initial  sign  of  the  regime’s  changing
perception of  its  political relationship with China:  "[Mr Jang]  is  said  to
have had ties  to  Chinese oﬃcials  (selling  them resources  too cheaply,
perhaps). […] More conventionally, he is said to have been an advocate of
the sort of reforms that China promotes, through the opening of more
special economic zones." (cf.  ibid).  In other words, and viewed through
the geo-political  lens  in  the  context  of  North  Korea’s  relationship  with
China and North Korea, Mr Jang’s dismissal could prove to be a signiﬁcant
political earthquake and therefore more than just a debut of the public
cruciﬁxion of regime oﬃcials.
In  fact,  China  has  been  urging  the  North  Korean  regime  to  adapt  by
commencing  economic  reforms  according  to  the  Chinese  example  for
quite some time now. Similarly, China has been hoping that North Korea
will  ﬁnally  be  able  to  overcome  its  isolationism  through  economic
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reforms. (cf. Fritz 2004: 130, cited by Stingeder 2010: 56-57) In general and
apart from Mr Jang’s recent demise and purging under the auspices of
Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s military potential and economic development
are both playing a key role for the entire region. The question remains as
to whether North Korea’s elite is willing to accept the risks of an opening
and if it is also willing to cooperate with the international community in
terms of  disarmament  and arms control.  Another  important  aspect  in
terms of mutual political relations in the region is the fact that mutual
trust on both sides is undeniably very low. And yet, North Korea continues
to play its key role speaking of its part in the course of a remarkable tense
geo-political constellation: US, Japan and South Korea on one hand, China
and Russia on the other – and North Korea right in the middle – all of
whom  are  pursuing  their  own  interests  and  strategic  objectives.
Consequently, any political developments or military engagements on the
peninsula are accompanied by immanent potential risks. Furthermore, a
lasting solution to  the crisis  is  not  yet  within  reach.  A  key role  in  this
context is whether Kim Jong-Il’s heir will be supported by the military as
was the case for Kim Jong-Il with his "army ﬁrst" policy, which he initiated
following Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994 and his subsequent succession.
In  terms  of  the  geopolitical  position,  once  again  the  remarkable  geo-
political  constellation on the peninsula should be emphasized:  the US,
Japan and South Korea on one hand, China and Russia on the other – and
North Korea right in the middle – all  of  whom are pursuing their own
interests  and  strategic  objectives.  Consequently,  any  political
developments  or  military  engagements  on  the  peninsula  are
accompanied by immanent potential risks. (cf. Stingeder 2010: 113 and cf.
Stingeder  2013:  Internet  source)  Both  the  isolationism  and  media
restriction strategies remain fundamental cornerstones of the regime for
systematically  controlling  the  North  Korean  people.  As  outlined,
international travel is exclusively reserved to the diplomatic sector and
access to the telephone and Internet is only granted to the elite. What is
more, citizens of the country have virtually no access to news that has not
passed through the regime’s censorship and propaganda machinery.
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In  conclusion,  any  economic  reform  efforts  which  might  have  been
applied in North Korea – from today's perspective – have not yet affected
or  improved  the  grave  political  restrictions  on  basic  civil  and  human
rights. Ultimately, the regime’s fear of its own demise still manifests itself
in a tight grasp on the media. It is safe to assume that "North Korea has
one of the world’s most repressive media environments." (Berger 2013:
Internet  source).  In  systematically  limiting  access  to  the  media  by  the
people  of  North  Korea  and  ﬂooding  authorised  media  channels  with
propaganda,  it  hopes to choke political  opposition and suppress weak
signs of a "civil society" before any organised movement blossoms into
something that would truly be capable of threatening the existence of the
North Korean regime. The question now is whether in committing this
ﬁrst public cruciﬁxion, North Korea has willingly added a new variable to
its  tightly  controlled media  landscape:  an "all-out"  propaganda against
once trusted but subsequently disgraced members of the regime.
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